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high watermark of a river is determined based upon the current
condition of the river.
The supreme court concluded that its opinion coincided with case
law from other jurisdictions and public policy concerns. In particular,
the supreme court noted that the purpose underlying state ownership
of the beds of all its navigable waters is to protect the public's right of
navigation. Thus, the court found that any policy other than setting
the boundary at the current, post-dam waterline would yield absurd
results.
Vanessa L. Condra

OHIO
City of Northwood v. Wood County Reg'l Water & Sewer Dist., 711
N.E. 2d 1003 (Ohio 1999) (holding that a municipality may exercise
the power of eminent domain over public utility facilities of a regional
water and sewer district as long as such taking does not destroy the
existing public utility).
In 1992, by petition to the Common Pleas Court, several Ohio
municipalities formed the Wood County Regional Water and Sewer
District ("District"). The City of Northwood ("City"), however, elected
not to join the District as a result of an earlier study concluding the
City's best interests to own and operate its own water and sewer system
was more beneficial. In the meantime, the City's residents received
services from the District and many of the facilities owned and utilized
by the District in providing such services were located within the City.
In 1995, the City made an offer to purchase the District's facilities
located in the City. The District rejected the offer and, as a result, the
City announced its intent to appropriate the District's facilities within
the City.
The District responded by filing a complaint for declaratory and
injunctive relief preventing the City from accessing the District's utility
lines without authorization. Soon thereafter, the District filed a
second complaint seeking a declaratory judgment rendering the City's
proposed appropriation unlawful. In late 1995, the City filed a
petition for appropriation. The trial court ruled that the City could
appropriate the District's utility lines that served only City residents
and that the City had no authority to appropriate the District's main
lines passing through the City. Both the City and the District
appealed. The appellate court held that the City had neither the
constitutional nor statutory authority to appropriate the District's
property and that the City did not have the power to appropriate the
public utility facilities of another political subdivision.
The court allowed a discretionary appeal to decide the issue of
whether a municipality may exercise eminent domain over public
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utility facilities owned and operated by a regional water and sewer
district.
The Utility Clause of the Constitution authorized
municipalities to exercise the power of eminent domain to acquire
existing public utilities. Thus, the court concluded that the City, in
exercising its power of eminent domain over the District's facilities
within its boundaries, acted within the intended purpose of the Utility
Clause. However, a municipality may not exercise its power of
eminent domain over the property of another municipal corporation,
if the municipality's actions would either destroy the existing use or
interfere, leading to destruction of the use. The court broadly
interpreted this limitation making necessary the determination of
whether the proposed appropriation would interfere with the District
to such an extent that it would effectively lead to the destruction of the
District itself.
Although recognizing the existence of substantial evidence
regarding the effect of the proposed appropriation, because neither
the trial court nor the appellate court considered this issue clearly, the
court remanded the case for findings as to the effects of the City's
proposed appropriation of the District property. If the proposed
appropriation would result in the destruction of an existing public use
or the destruction, including economic destruction, of an existing
public utility operated by the District, the appropriation was
prohibited. If no such destructive effect was found, however, the City
would rightfully be exercising its power of eminent domain over an
existing public use.
Lucinda K Henriksen

OREGON
Kinross Copper Corp. v. State, 981 P.2d 833 (Or. Ct. App. 1999)
(holding that the state's decision to deny plaintiff's NPDES permit
application did not effect an uncompensated taking of plaintiff's
unpatented mining claims).
In 1975, Amoco Minerals Company ("Amoco") staked unpatented
mining claims in the North Santiam River Subbasin in the Willamette
In 1977, the Oregon Environmental Quality
National Forest.
Commission ("EQC") promulgated the Three Basin Rule prohibiting
any new or increased waste discharges to the North Santiam River
Subbasin.
In 1989, Amoco leased the unpatented mining claims to the
plaintiff, Kinross Copper Corporation ("Kinross"). Two years later,
Kinross developed a plan of operations for a copper ore mining
project. The plan required Kinross to discharge wastewater and
groundwater pumped from the mine into the North Santiam
Subbasin. The plan included obtaining a National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System ("NPDES") permit under applicable state and
federal laws.

